

an air strike or invasion as the next significant move if the quarantine itself failed to work.

Accommodation is the antithesis of much of the above **discussion**. Accommodation is a way of settling the crisis – so management implies settlement – without totally capitulating to the wishes and aims of the other parties. The immediate difficulty with offering concessions is that it may be perceived as a sign of weakness which will encourage the opponent to stand out for more. The dynamic in accommodation is therefore de-escalation. If concessions become mutual it may be possible for the adversaries to reciprocate concessions. Thus a significant improvement in their relationships may result from crisis management.

Most crises are settled by one side making a differentially greater concession than the other. Sometimes, as in Cuba, the winner will make a face-saving gesture to the adversary in order to make it easier to accept the outcome or to make it easier to sell the outcome to others (but see Lebow and Stein, 1994).

Crisis management, then, involves finding a balance between coercion and accommodation. This is a common problem in ►diplomacy. Should one be a ►hawk or a ►dove on a particular ►issue area? In this sense crisis management is rightly seen as a form of diplomacy. It is diplomacy in a ►coercive mode, certainly it is not routine diplomacy, but rather it is the ►high politics of the formal office holders.

**Critical Theory/Postmodernism** These terms are often used synonymously in IR literature. Though not altogether correct, this is understandable since many critical theorists are also postmodernists (or as some prefer 'late modernists'). The confusion is confounded by a fetish in contemporary theorizing for linguistic paradoxes, dialectics and niche labelling as well as an inherent ambiguity in the terms themselves. There is clearly a sense in which all theory is 'critical' as well as a sense in which everything which succeeds 'modern' is, *ipso facto*, 'postmodern'. As a consequence, precise meanings and definitions are sources of contention and dispute, even amongst self-proclaimed adherents to these schools of thought (Brown, 1994 and Devetak, 1996). A common distinguishing feature of both positions is that they represent a sustained challenge to existing theoretical traditions and moreover they reject IR as a discrete field of inquiry and seek to situate it in the wider intellectual context of social, political, cultural, philosophical and literary studies.

Critical Theory (CT) is associated with a body of thought generally known as the Frankfurt School, and in particular with the work of the German social theorist, Jurgen Habermas. For Habermas, CT entails questioning the very epistemological (source of knowledge) and ontological (nature of being) foundations of an existing social order; the central claim being that all knowledge is historically and politically based. In IR this mode of analysis appeared in the 1980s as a reaction to the dominance of the ►neorealist/neoliberal orthodoxy.

It claims that in spite of their differences and apparent opposition, both are premised on 'the Enlightenment project'; that is a belief in the liberation of humanity through reason and the judicious application of scientific knowledge. This, in essence, is 'modernity'. The 'critique' of modernity involves revealing its self-serving, particularist and privileged nature. The 'crisis' of modernity is that belief that the dominant trends of progressivist nineteenth- and twentieth-century political thought (in this case liberalism, Marxism and social democracy) has led not to emancipation and liberation as promised, but to new modes of enslavement and dehumanization, reaching its apogee in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. The intellectual origins of these approaches are found in the works of Kant, Hegel, Marx and especially for the postmodernists, Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom the triumph of rationality portends disaster. The differences between critical theorists and postmodernists lie in their respective reactions to the supposed 'failure' of the Enlightenment project; the latter work towards its complete demise whilst the former strive for its deconstruction and eventual recasting. In IR both subscribe to the Marxist view that the basic task is not to interpret the world, but rather to change it. Thus both involve radical assaults on conventional theory which remains stubbornly rooted in the 'anarchy problématique'; neorealism seeking to work within its structural constraints and neoliberalism attempting to ameliorate its worst effects. The driving belief is that through the deconstruction of orthodox theory, 'thinking spaces' are opened up (thus circumventing discourse 'closure') and new possibilities for social and political transformations are made available. The belief that 'theory is always for someone or something' (i.e. that theories are always embedded in social and political life) is the starting point in the quest for emancipation and empowerment. In IR the villain of the piece is the Westphalian system and its privileging of the sovereign nation-state within a behavioral framework of an anarchical social order. Feminist and gender scholarship originates within this discourse and is a powerful exemplar of its central thesis since women in particular are 'silenced' or 'excluded' in the meta-text/narrative.

A major point of difference between the new scholarship and the old, in the words of a leading exponent of CT, is that traditional (or 'problem-solving') theory 'takes the world as it finds it with the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action' (Cox, 1981). Working within this order neorealism and neoliberalism serve to preserve it thereby perpetrating existing inequalities of power and wealth. Orthodox theory is therefore inherently conservative and status quo orientated. In contrast, through the exposure of the social basis of knowledge, power and values, the new scholarship 'liberates' international theory to the extent that injustices and inequalities built in to the prevailing order can be addressed. This challenge to orthodoxy is regarded by some as the 'Third Great Debate' in the subject. It supposedly pits the guardians or gatekeepers of the old order (represented by scholars such as K. N. Waltz and

R. O. Keohane in the USA and by the ►English school in the UK) against the vanguard or Young Turks of the profession, many of whom, despite the essentially iconoclastic nature of their challenge, now occupy senior positions within a discipline which in their categorization does not formally exist.

It is difficult at this stage to assess the overall contribution made by CT and Postmodernism. There is no doubt that at least in terms of language, concepts and method, they have transformed, probably for ever, the nature and scope of the subject. It is now much more self-consciously inter-disciplinary. But whether or not its central focus has been relocated into the realm of normative social theory is a moot point. The main contribution of new thinking has been to expose the essentially static, exclusive and insular nature of traditional international theory and to render genuine political and social change at least a theoretical possibility. However, like the ►behaviouralists of the Second Great Debate, they have not so far produced the goods. Deconstruction has not yet given way to reconstruction or to emancipation. As such, the research and teaching programme in IR remains essentially contested territory.

**Cruise missile** A cruise missile is, in effect, a small pilotless aircraft. The original ►technology was developed during the Second World War when Germany produced the V-1 'flying bomb'. Significant improvements were made to this technology in two respects during the years following 1945. First, it became possible to produce small, very economical jet engines, using either the turbo-jet or the turbo-fan principle. Second, significant developments in missile guidance techniques made it possible to 'read' the terrain over which the missile was flying and compare this information with that stored on computer. This guidance facility is particularly crucial if the cruise missile is intended for strategic purposes because, given a flight time of up to six hours, course corrections will be essential.

Cruise missiles can carry either nuclear or ►conventional warheads. It is, moreover, not possible to distinguish the type of warhead from the external appearance of the missile. This has potentially daunting implications for ►arms control because counting missiles is of little value in establishing their nuclear/conventional status. This facility is referred to as 'dual ►capability'.

Cruise missile development has proceeded apace since these new technologies became available. This has been particularly evident in the USA. Production and deployment has taken place in respect of air, ground and sea-launch systems. It is plausible to argue that these developments rival the advances in multiple warheads in their significance.

**CSCE/OSCE** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This formed part of the ►Helsinki process and its Final Act was signed on 1 August 1975 by 35 states – comprising all the European countries, except Albania, together with the USA and Canada. (Albania was subsequently admitted as a participating state in June 1991.) The Final Act was not a binding ►treaty but

respect the field showed commonality with other social sciences which had similarly sought to distinguish the wood from the trees and the trees from the forest. In the two references cited Singer varied between a micro/macro dichotomy and the individual/►state/system evinced by Waltz.

Over subsequent years the value of explicit and prompt recognition of the operational level of analysis was generally recognized by scholars. It was testimony to their efficacy that they became good habits rather than self-conscious decisions. The fields of ►conflict research and ►integration studies can be exemplified in this regard. The publication twenty years after the volume on war of a systems analysis of IR by Waltz (1979) resuscitated the issue of levels since the ensuing debate between Waltz and his critics over ►neorealism implicitly raised these matters. Waltz was seen to have struck out in favour of the ►macropolitical level in this highly influential study, although his preferences in this regard had been well flagged up two decades earlier.

Recently Buzan (1995) has sought to review and reconstitute the discussion on levels by in effect suggesting that the term has two meanings: one is the aforementioned idea of units. Here Buzan suggests five: system, subsystem, unit, bureaucracy, individual. The other meaning is as sources of explanation. Here Buzan suggests three levels: structure, process and interaction capacity. In effect Buzan wants to talk about *horizontal* and *vertical* levels corresponding to units of analysis and sources of explanation. Whether Buzan's excursion into what he terms 'intellectual history' has clarified or muddied the waters remains to be seen. As with the original distinction of Singer's custom and practice within the discipline will be the ultimate judge. \*Agent-structure

**Liberalism** The liberal tradition in international affairs can be traced back at least as far as John Locke (1632-1704) but it is in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that liberalism has had its most enduring impact. Indeed, the development of modern ►international relations would be incomprehensible without an appreciation of the part played by the liberal approach. For example, the role of ►international organizations such as the ►League of Nations and the ►United Nations can be directly attributed to the liberal quest for the elimination of the international ►anarchy and the inauguration of the rule of law. It could be argued that the success of liberalism in the twentieth century is due to the influence in world politics of its most powerful proponent, the United States, but this would be to deny one of the basic tenets of its belief system – the idea that progress is inevitable and that the ►realist responses to the question of ►world order are atavistic and inherently dangerous.

The liberal theory of international relations contains a number of propositions, most of which derive from the domestic analogy concerning the relationship between individuals within the state. Among the most important are the following:

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Liberalism

- 1 >peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a world-wide basis Governments, not people, cause >wars >Democracy is the highest expression of the will of the people, therefore democracies are inherently more pacific than other political systems An >international system composed of democratic >states would, in consequence, lead to a condition of perpetual peace, where >conflict and war would disappear This is self-evident and based on reason Best known proponents of this view are Kant and Woodrow Wilson, both of whom believed that the solution to the problems of world order and security lay in the spread of the democratic ideal In this connection 'consent' is the only legitimate grounds for government, therefore >imperialism is immoral. >Self-determination is a condition of democracy, just as the final bar at the court of world judgement is >public opinion which in the last resort is the safeguard of peace
- 2 Bound up with this, and underpinning it, is a belief in the 'natural >harmony of interests'. If people and states make rational calculations of their interests and act upon them, something akin to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' would ensure that the >national interest and the >international interest would be one and the same. The free market and the perfectibility of human nature would encourage >interdependence and demonstrate conclusively that 'war does not pay' (Angell, 1910).
- 3 If disputes continue to occur, these would be settled by established judicial procedures, since the rule of law is just as applicable to states as it is to individuals An international legal >regime based on common voluntary membership of international organizations would begin to fulfil the functions of a legislature, executive and judiciary, while still preserving the freedom and >independence of the states.
- 4 >Collective security would replace notions of >self-help. The assumption here is that just as it must always be possible to identify an >aggressor so also must it be possible to organize a preponderant collective coalition of law-abiding states to oppose it. The League of Nations and the United Nations were founded on this premise; >security being conceived of as a collective, communal responsibility rather than an individual one.

These are core beliefs of liberalism but liberals themselves often disagree as to the advisability of particular courses of action. In this context, it is instructive to distinguish between >interventionist and >non-interventionist liberals. The former, among whom Woodrow Wilson figures prominently, believe that although 'progress' is historically inevitable, it is sometimes necessary to help it along. Thus, war on behalf of the liberal ideal may occasionally be required to rid the world of illiberal and persistent opponents. The >just war or the crusade are perfectly permissible policies provided the object is to further the cause of democratic liberalism. This attitude to war was put most succinctly by R. H. Tawney: 'Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime. There is no half-way

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house.' The non-interventionists, on the other hand, believe that a liberal world order is implicit in history and that the virtues of liberalism itself would spread without any active prodding by its adherents. Nineteenth-century American traditions of isolationism were often expressed in these terms; the new politics of the New World would, by dint of its own obvious superiority, sweep all before it. However, the emergence in the twentieth century of two powerful anti-liberal ideologies, fascism and communism have rendered the non-interventionist stance somewhat anachronistic. Since the Second World War and the defeat of fascism, the liberal stand has been taken on the ground of containment which argues that the future of liberal democracy rests on its ability first, to stop the spread of communism and second, to eliminate it altogether. Containment, can thus be seen as a compromise between interventionism and non-interventionism, but it is as well to stress that liberalism, whether active or passive, on the battlefield or in the market place, envisages the eventual defeat of the force of illiberalism in whatever garb it decks itself.

It is this self-righteousness and spirit of moral omnipotence that is one of the weaknesses of contemporary liberalism, as it all too easily leads to policies of sustaining the status quo almost at any cost. US foreign policy, in particular, has come under repeated criticism for supporting regimes with appalling records on human rights on the sole grounds that these regimes were anti-communist. Nevertheless, the 'victory' of the liberal democratic ideal in the Cold War has led many to believe that, for the foreseeable future at least, this now is the only game in town. The triumphalism that greeted what Francis Fukuyama called 'the end of history' is testimony to this.

The dark side of liberalism is its chronic inability to come to terms with the use of force for particular and specific ends. Realists have never been slow to point this out. The brighter side is that it honestly and self-consciously intends to work for a brave new world where human rights and the well being of individuals are given a higher priority than state's rights and the narrower conceptions of national interest which characterize the more traditional approaches. Whether this is regarded as unduly idealistic and utopian depends upon one's own general, political orientation. Democratic peace theory; economic liberalism; neoliberalism

**Liberation theology** A branch of Christian theology which emphasizes the important role that the Church can play in the achievement of social justice and ameliorating the conditions of the poor and oppressed. Employing a Marxist or socialist view of social, economic and political conditions, it calls for activist intervention on the part of the clergy in the struggle against exploitation both from internal and external sources. It has had a profound impact on Third World politics generally, but it is in Latin America that it has achieved its greatest political impact. At a conference of Roman Catholic bishops of Latin America at Medellín in Colombia in 1968 there was near-

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## National interest

relations. However, it is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It developed in Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of the centralized state claiming exclusive and monopolistic authority within a defined territorial area. Absolute political power within the community and independence outside it are characteristic features. With the emergence of a number of such political formations the modern framework of international relations began to take shape, that is, separate political units interacting within a context where no final arbiter or authority is recognized or indeed present. Historically, the fusion of 'nation' and 'state' post-dated the process of political centralization and it was the nineteenth century that witnessed the dovetailing of political organizations with a political social grouping which constituted the 'nation'. The people comprising the nation became the ultimate source of the state's legitimacy and the national idea itself became the natural repository of, and focus for, political loyalty. Thus, it was during this period that the coincidence of the boundaries of state jurisdiction and the characteristic elements that made up 'nationhood' took place. In the twentieth century this process became a universal one, though it should be noted that nations can exist without states and that states are not always composed of ethnically homogeneous social, cultural or linguistic groups. The nation-state, which is commonly regarded as the 'ideal' or 'normal' political unit, is in fact a particular form of territorial state – others are city-states and empires – and many commentators regard it as a disruptive force in the modern world. In particular, its obsessive emphasis on nationalism, on sovereignty and on *raison d'état* has tended to mitigate against the development of a cohesive and pacific international community. The twentieth century has witnessed what appears to be a growing trend towards supranational forms of political organization, especially on a regional basis, yet the nation-state is still a potent force in international relations. However, its detractors have argued that although it may have been the most effective political formation in terms of providing economic well being, physical security and national identity, there is no guarantee that this will continue. After all, the nation-state is an artificial, not a natural, construct and it may well be that despite its near-universality, it may already be something of an anachronism. However, some post-Cold War developments, especially secessionism and ethnic cleansing, may indicate a resurgence and malign refinement of the idea, as events in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia indicate. »Nation; ethno-nationalism

**National interest** Used generally in two senses in IR: as an analytical tool identifying the goals or objectives of foreign policy and as an all-embracing concept of political discourse used specifically to justify particular policy preferences. In both senses it refers to the basic determinants that guide state policy in relation to the external environment. It applies only to sovereign states and relates specifically to foreign policy: the internal variety usually being

characterized as 'the public interest'. According to Charles Beard (1934), the first scholar to produce a sustained analysis, the term entered the political lexicon in sixteenth century Europe and began to replace the older notion of *raison d'état* in harness with the development of the 'nation-state' and nationalism. It expressed no particular dynastic or state-familial interests but the interests of the society as a whole and as such was linked with the idea of popular 'sovereignty' and the 'legitimacy' of the state. Thereafter it came to represent the entire rationale for the exercise of state 'power' in 'international relations'.

As an instrument of political analysis it is particularly associated with the school of political 'realism' and its most influential advocate was Hans Morgenthau (1951), for whom the concept was of central importance in undemanding the process of international politics. Morgenthau's thesis that the acquisition and use of power is the primary national interest of a state had a profound effect on a generation of scholars in the 1950s and 1960s and consequently on the development of the discipline as a whole. For Morgenthau, the idea of national interest defined in terms of power as the central motif of state behaviour had an objective and therefore discoverable reality. However, his emphasis on military and economic dimensions to the virtual exclusion of other factors (especially the notion that principles or moral values could play a dominant part in formulating policy) led to a reappraisal of the concept and a rejection of the presumption that it was synonymous with the pursuit of power. Since then the idea of the national interest as the key to foreign policy analysis has largely been superseded, 'decision-making' theorists in particular argued that far from having objective reality the interests that guide foreign policy are more likely to be a diverse, 'pluralistic' set of subjective preferences that change periodically both in response to the domestic political process itself and in response to shifts in the international environment. The national interest therefore is more likely to be what the policy-makers say it is at any particular time. Its value in 'analysis' has been further eroded by the move away from state-centrism and the strategic-diplomatic milieu and the emergence of models of 'complex interdependence' and 'world society'. The term has consequently been largely ignored in recent literature on 'international relations'. Indeed, in much contemporary theory it is the 'sin that dare not speak its name' because of its symbiotic relationship with 'realpolitik' and political realism.

In essence, at the root of the idea of the national interest is the principle of national security and survival. The defence of the homeland and the preservation of territorial integrity is basic to it. It is presumed that all other policy preferences are subordinate to this one. The term 'vital interest' is often used in this connection, the implication being that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the well being of the state that it cannot be compromised and so may result in the use of military force to sustain it. However, vital interests may not relate solely to questions of national survival. The Vietnam War, for example, was

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regarded, at least by some administrations, as involving a vital interest of the United States yet at no time was the territorial homeland threatened. Other considerations involved in the concept which are equally if not more value-laden are the ideas associated with economic well-being, the promotion of ideological principles and the establishment of a favourable world order or balance. All these, either singly or in combination, could be regarded as vital depending (among other things) on the dominant perceptions of the decision-makers at the time. Attempts have been made to develop models or matrices of the varying levels of intensity an interest may be expected to generate (eg is it a 'survival' issue, a 'vital' issue, a 'major' issue or a 'peripheral' issue?) but these have floundered on the bedrock of subjectivism. One actor's peripheral interest may well be a matter of survival to another. In sum, the concept does highlight important factors in foreign policy analysis and continues to be used in political discourse, but its value as a research tool is extremely limited. » Goal

**Nationalism** This term is used in two related senses, first, to identify an ideology and secondly, to describe a sentiment. In the first usage, nationalism seeks to identify a behavioural entity – the 'nation' – and thereafter to pursue certain political and cultural goals on behalf of it. Pre-eminent among these will be national self-determination. This may be empirically defined in a number of ways, irredentism, independence, secession are all goals that may be sought under its rubric. In its second usage, nationalism is a sentiment of loyalty towards the nation which is shared by people. Elements of cohesion are provided by such factors as language, religion, shared historical experience, physical contiguity and so on. In the last resort such bonds must be integrated into a perceptual framework which subjectively defines a group of people as different from their neighbours and similar to each other. Empirical instances continually show that it is perfectly possible to create such a sense of national identity in the absence of some of the above factors. In short, it is difficult to stipulate convincingly that there is any cohesive factor that is necessary or sufficient for the creation of such sentiments.

The ideological origins of nationalism are to be found in the political history of Western Europe after the collapse of feudalism. It first became manifest during the French Revolution and thereafter the nineteenth century saw it reach its zenith in Europe. The Italian Risorgimento was perhaps the precursor of the twentieth century phenomenon of nationalism as a resistance movement against foreign domination. In general, intellectual opinion in the nineteenth century was inclined towards the view that the nation represented a 'natural' bond amongst humans and that, accordingly, nations should form the basis for states. This fusion of the nation and the state into the nation-state idea became such an influential factor that it gave rise to a whole category of relations – international relations – and a complete perspective on activities – that of state-centrism.

Agreements are most usually reached through compromise if negotiations are not to break down. In order to compromise parties agree to a partial withdrawal from their initial positions. This withdrawal need not be symmetrical and it is not infrequent that one side will appear to submit to demands made of it without seeking an adequate *quid pro quo*. The essential point about compromise, as Kenneth Boulding has pointed out, is that all parties must appreciate that the price of continued conflict is higher than the costs of reducing demands. Compromise is, in fact, a two-step process, the first being that all sides withdraw some of their demands in preference for a continuation of the status quo and, having made this move, the bargaining for the actual terms of the compromise can take place. These two stages can be termed 'the commitment to compromise' and the 'compromise bargain', respectively.

The physical environment against which negotiations take place can be significant. Under this rubric such factors as the venue, the number of parties and the degree of secrecy or openness can be significant. The choice of venue will often be dominated by considerations of ►neutrality. Other considerations may be good access to communications and the nature of the issues to be negotiated. Bilateral negotiations are, for obvious reasons, more manageable but run the risk that by excluding third parties, important interests will not be consulted and will therefore not feel constrained to support any agreement. Conversely ►multilateral negotiations are more unwieldy but have the advantage of allowing all parties to be represented. The debate between open and secret negotiations is an old problem about which strong views were held by both ►idealists and ►realists. The dichotomy is empirically overdone. No contemporary negotiation is completely open or secret. In this respect the open/secret categories mark the ends of a continuum between which actual negotiations can be ranged. Factors that are likely to affect the movement towards one end or the other will include: the level of amity/enmity between the parties, the reasons for the negotiations and the perceived need for public support during the process itself. The CODESA negotiations which resulted in the successful 1994 multi-party elections in South Africa exemplified virtually all the conditions mentioned above.

**Neo-colonialism** ►Colonialism

**Neo-functionalism** An academic theory of ►integration originally suggested by Haas (1958) as a result of his work on the European Coal and Steel Community. As the term implies, neo-,functionalism is a modern variant of functionalism. Both theories are based upon the view that integration proceeds best by working from areas of mutual and overlapping interest in a piecemeal fashion. This is often referred to in the literature as the 'sector approach'. Both theories assume that these sectors will in all probability be located in the ►issue area of political economy. Both theories assume that people's loyalties to their existing nation-states will be steadily eroded as they see that integration has

many positive benefits and that these can best be obtained, and sustained, by the new nexus.

Neo-functionalism differs from functionalism in a number of important respects. First, it is a theory of regional rather than global integration, and specifically a theory of how this process has been achieved in Western Europe since 1945. By concentrating upon a region in this way the neo-functionalists have been able to achieve great parsimony of concepts and theories. The main weakness inherent in the regional concentration is that a certain breadth of vision is thereby lost. Second, neo-functionalists have been much more concerned with institution building than were the original functionalists. With this in mind, Mitrany (1975) dubbed them 'federal-functionalists'. Notwithstanding, neo-functionalism is distinctly orientated towards the political aspects and implications of integration. Central to this view is that once commenced, sector integration will lead to a spillover effect into other cognate areas of activity. In particular, in those issue areas where high levels of interdependence actually or potentially exist, spillover integration will be difficult to resist. Moreover, as interest groups within the member states begin to see the positive benefits of the process, they will actually initiate moves for further integration. Spillover, therefore, may be semi-automatic or manually operated.

The events in Western Europe in the 1950s seemed to confirm the explanatory significance of neo-functionalism. The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was followed by further attempts at the sector method of integration. Although the European Defence Community failed to secure the ratification of all its putative members, the formation of the European Economic Community and of Euratom in January 1958 seemed to confirm the logic of neo-functionalist thinking. Within the institutional structure of the Community, neo-functionalists place their greatest confidence in the Commission. Although nominated by the member states, the Commissioners represent the supranational rather than the state-centric tendencies in the arrangement. Fresh initiatives for integration and recognition of spillover tendencies are likely to come from the Commission. The initiation of a directly elected European Parliament after June 1979 further strengthened the neo-functionalist institutions within the Community.

Neo-functionalism comes from the same intellectual stable as the US school of political sociology known as 'Pluralism'. Like the pluralists, they assume that politics is a group activity and that in advanced industrial societies power and influence will be diffused among a number of competing groups. Because competition rather than conflict is the norm, the nature of the political activity will be circumscribed by a basic underlying consensus. Differences of degree rather than differences of kind will identify these groups and politics will be a bargaining process often identified as incrementalism. These pluralist assumptions fit well together with the point mentioned above, that neo-functionalism tends to concentrate upon the issue area of political economy as particularly

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susceptible to integration. Since advanced industrial societies tend to be preoccupied with wealth/welfare questions, the whole set of assumptions are self-reinforcing. It is not surprising to find that the neo-functionalists expect politics at the supranational level to be similar to politics at the national level. Both are dependent upon the same pluralist conceptions.

In the 1960s Western European neo-functionalism encountered ►Gaullism. As a result the assumptions, particularly about the dynamic tendencies of spillover, were called into question. It became clear that the ideas derived from pluralism, referred to above, were in themselves dependent variables and that political ►elites with fundamentally different perceptions would not be able to work the same system in the same way. Moreover, to the extent that these elites exercised constitutional authority within their own states, they were able and willing to exercise ►veto power over groups such as the commission. It is now accepted by neo-functionalists that the Council of Ministers and the European Council represent this veto power and that, with the accession of the United Kingdom after 1973, a further enhancement of Gaullist tendencies took place.

What many see as the relaunching of European integration in the 1980s was not accompanied by a significant resuscitation or redefinition of neo-functionalism. Instead the recent history in Europe has been a melange of ►confederalism, federalism and neo-functionalism. It is clear that in the European instance a 'union of states' rather than a 'united states' is being created. This eclecticism has a place for neo-functionalism but it is not exclusive to that theory.

**Neo-isolationism** Unlike its derivative ►isolationism, this term refers exclusively to the ►foreign policy ►orientation of the United States of America. In the American context, isolationism has been seen as her oldest and most enduring orientation but one about which debate has raged and dubiety felt. In the twentieth century the impact of ►Pearl Harbor was believed to have removed isolationism from the agenda of public debate and even civilized discussion. Pearl Harbor seemed to invalidate the policy assumptions of a generation that had sought to pursue ►unilateral ►goals and to put America first. The events of the 1970s, and in particular the outcome of the ►Vietnam War, restored isolationism, which was now increasingly dubbed neo-isolationism, to public debate. In particular the growing impact of ►declinism on American attitudes to ►international relations sent many back to America's roots in search of an alternative ►paradigm to ►internationalism.

In keeping with its derivative, neo-isolationism is a broad spectrum of aspirations, assumptions and attitudes. Realists tend to take their cue from the idea of the ►national interest as the benchmark in their assessment of America's role. Taking a broadly 'Washingtonian' view the national interest version of neo-isolationism argues that America can no longer afford to define its security

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in globalist, internationalist terms. The end of the Cold War in particular should suggest that permanence is a vice and flexibility a virtue. America's engagement with the world outside its own hemisphere should be selective and dictated by national priorities above all else. 'Pactomania' is a Cold War syndrome which America no longer needs. Writers like Carpenter (1992) have argued for America to make a strategic declaration of independence in the post Cold War world, whilst Tonelson et al (1991) have combined neo-isolationism with neo-mercantilism to pick up on themes discussed in Kennedy (1988) about the economic costs of a global security policy. Liberalism has joined forces with realism in the neo-isolationist paradigm. Picking up on themes that are deeply embedded in American exceptionalism the liberal neo-isolationist sees America's involvement in 'entangling' security commitments as a means whereby the United States was inexorably drawn into fighting others battles on terms which compromised the role of being an exemplar nations for others to follow. The antiwar movement during Vietnam and the Vietnam Syndrome thereafter are organizational and ideational indicators of the extent to which foreign involvements produce domestic costs. The thesis of the Imperial Presidency (Schlesinger 1974) is a salutary warning of the impact that foreign entanglements have upon the balance of the American constitution.

As McGrew has pointed out (1994) neo-isolationism involves an *ad hoc* approach to military engagements and a new concern with economic and social regeneration inside America. In this sense the Neo-Isolationist paradigm rejects Cold War triumphalism in favour of a more sober assessment of the winners and losers in the Cold War. Public opinion studies seem to confirm a strong latent sense of isolationism amongst mass publics in the United States which confirms the enduring impact of this orientation upon American diplomacy.

**Neoliberalism** Sometimes referred to as 'neoliberal institutionalism.' This term distinguishes neoliberalism from earlier varieties of liberalism such as 'commercial' liberalism (theories which link free trade with peace), 'republican' liberalism (theories linking democracy and peace) and 'sociological' liberalism (theories of international integration). Neoliberalism which is inclusive of all the above is generally understood to be the most comprehensive theoretical challenge to the realist/neorealist orthodoxy in mainstream international theory (see Baldwin 1993).

The principal charge levelled against political realism is its obsession with the war/peace, and military/diplomatic dimensions of international relations and its fixation on the nation-state as key actor. While not denying the anarchic character of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated and moreover that realists/neorealists underestimate the varieties of cooperative behaviour possible within such a decentralized system. Concentration on the security dilemma they argue, severely limits the scope and domain of international relations and renders

## Neo-mercantilism

it anachronistic as a model of global relations. Indeed, neoliberals define 'security' in much broader terms than neorealists: moving away from a ►geopolitical/military reading of the term, they emphasize wealth/welfare and environmental issues as equally valid considerations. Thus, they focus on institution-building, ►regime creation and the search for 'absolute' rather than 'relative' gains as mitigating strategies in a quasi-anarchic arena. Although nation-states continue to be important actors, they have declined in their ability to effect outcomes, particularly on the plethora of issues that transcend political ►boundaries. Instead of a single agency, neoliberals favour a ►mixed-actor model which includes ►international organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs, MNCs and other non-state players. The dynamics of international relations arise from a multiple sources involving a mix of interactions not captured by the simplistic (albeit elegant and parsimonious) theories of realism/neorealism. Keohane and Nye (1977) refer to this process as ►complex interdependence and argue that the exclusiveness of neorealism fails to capture the complexities of international behaviour and in particular distorts reality by ignoring the institutions, processes, rules and norms that provide a measure of governance in a formally anarchic environment. In sum, neoliberals contend that the IR agenda has been greatly expanded in the twentieth century, particularly in the non-military wealth/welfare/environmental arenas. Therefore theories that concentrate on military/diplomatic ►issue areas are bound to be one-dimensional, since they are wedded to the past and incapable of dealing with systemic change.

Neorealists for their part argue that neoliberals exaggerate the extent to which institutions are able to mitigate anarchy, and they underestimate the potency of ►nationalism and the sheer durability of the nation-state. Although they agree that cooperation is possible under anarchy it is much harder to achieve and maintain than neoliberals allege. In this connection, the future of the ►European Union is regarded as an important test for both theories. For ►critical theorists and ►postmodernists, both approaches are faulty, since both are located in the 'anarchy problématique'. The much vaunted differences are in fact minimal. Neorealists tend to study security issues; neoliberals tend to focus on economic issues. Both are similarly obsessed with conflict and cooperation within a ►self-help environment and therefore critically assume that actors behave as egotistic value maximisers. Most importantly neither approach critically addresses the ►normative presuppositions of the anarchical order they work within. In this sense, both accept the prevailing ►definition of the situation and both are embedded within a privileged, ►status quo conception of international relations and eschew explanations of approaches not based on rational choice theory.

**Neo-mercantilism** Neo-mercantilism or new mercantilism is, as the term implies, the resurgence of ►mercantilism. Historically, two examples of this regeneration are usually cited. First, the period between 1919 and 1939 and,

Neorealism

of production and efficiency of price. At the same time it provides stocks of surplus food which can be distributed in the form of economic aid for political purposes.

It should not be thought that the European Union is the only standard-bearer of neo-mercantilism in the present system. One of the characteristics of this type of political economy is that it provokes retaliation, tit-for-tat measures and even trade wars. From the perspective of the economic liberal, neo-mercantilism becomes a bad habit which others quickly learn to emulate.

**Neorealism** Sometimes called 'new' or structural realism, this theoretical perspective is associated with the writings of K. N. Waltz, especially his influential *Theory of International Politics* (1979, see especially chs. 5-6). While retaining many of the basic features of 'classical' realism (e.g. states as key rational unitary actors and power as a central analytical concept), neorealism directs attention to the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than to its component units. The concept of 'structure' here refers to the 'ordering' or the 'arrangement' of the parts of a system, and in Waltz's formulation it is the structural constraints of the global system itself, rather than the attributions of particular component units, that to a large extent explain state behaviour and affect international outcomes. In Waltz's words: 'By depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes theory about it possible. Neorealism develops the concept of a system's structure which at once bounds the domain that students of international politics deal with and enables them to see how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcome they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others' (Waltz, 1990).

In other words, it is 'structure' that shapes and constrains the political relationships of the component units. The system is still anarchical, and the units are still deemed to be autonomous, but attention to the structural level of analysis enables a more dynamic and less restrictive picture of international political behaviour to emerge. Traditional realism, by concentrating on the units and their functional attributes, is unable to account for changes in behaviour or in the distribution of power which occur independently of fluctuations within the units themselves. Neorealism, on the other hand, explains how structures affect behaviour and outcomes regardless of characteristics attributed to power and status.

Waltz argued that the international system functions like a market which is 'interposed between the economic actors and the results they produce. It conditions their calculations, their behaviour and their interactions' (pp. 90-91). Not all neorealists accept his image of the market as the primary force field

of international relations, but all accept the basic propositions regarding the centrality of the state as rational, unitary actor and the importance of the distribution of power (i.e. overall systemic structure) in the analysis of inter-state behaviour, outcomes and decision-making perceptions. Waltz's reworking of political realism has attracted much critical attention, especially from ►neoliberals and, in a more dismissive fashion, from critical theorists and ►postmodernists, but few would deny that *Theory of International Politics* is the most sophisticated defence of realism and the theory of ►balance of ►power in contemporary international theory. (Agent-structure)

**Nesting** Term associated with ►neoliberalism which argues that advanced democracies share a cluster of common interests and therefore are well placed to seek 'absolute' rather than 'relative' gains, since their economic arrangements are 'nested' in larger political – strategic ►alliances. 'Nesting' thus promotes cooperation and compliance since allies take comfort in each others' economic successes as this strengthens their combined military ►capability. This contrasts with the realist view that states can never be indifferent to the gains of others: in cooperative arrangements they will always worry that their partners might gain more than they do. Theories of nesting are thus located in the ►neorealist/neoliberal debate about the nature and consequences of ►anarchy (see Keohane 1984)

**Neutralism** Increasingly replaced in the vocabulary of IR by the term ►non-alignment, neutralism refers to a declaration of non-participation in specific conflicts and of treating all parties impartially. Such a policy need not necessarily apply to all international conflicts since neutrals can belong to ►regional ►alliances; it is therefore possible to be neutral *vis-à-vis* a particular conflict and an active participant in another one. India, for example, declared itself neutral in the ►Cold War yet maintained strong regional commitments. Neutralism is often regarded as a useful posture to serve the security interests of new and relatively weak ►states in the ►international system. Not taking sides may maximize the possibilities of genuine independence in a ►bipolar world. It may also serve an important domestic function in that decision-making ►elites can avoid the charge that they are tools of one international faction or another and of course it also has the advantage of giving freedom of action and flexibility to the practising state. Indeed, one of the benefits of noncommitment during the Cold War was that it helped to undermine rigid bipolarity and force the ►superpowers to widen the ►scope of their policies. In particular, economic, social and developmental issues have been highlighted at the expense of narrower confrontational policies. This has been especially evident in the General Assembly of the ►United Nations Organization.

Neutralism should not be confused with ►neutrality which has a specific legal connotation nor should it be confused with isolationism which, nominally

Power

## Pluralism

This 'two-state' position was legitimized in September 1993 in the Israeli-Palestine Declaration of Principles. This D O P agreement in effect implemented the 'land-for-peace' formula by a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and selected areas of the West bank in return for Palestinian recognition of Israel. Following the initial withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho in June 1994 the Palestinian authority (PA) was created to administer these territories. Although Israeli political leaders have eschewed the use of the term 'State' to identify the lands under PA autonomy, *de facto* this is now the position. The major issues identified in the D O P but still unresolved include the status of Jewish settlements in areas outside the 1948 borders and the status of Jerusalem. Israeli/PA relations continue to be fraught with destabilizing possibilities particularly over the vexed question of security. At the same time these relations have become caught up with domestic party politics in Israel and with radical Islam. Hawks can be found on both sides setting the parameters for the main protagonists to operate within. The D O P and its subsequent hesitant implementation exemplifies conflict settlement rather than conflict resolution.

It is clear that the achievements of the P L O have been realized at some cost, both personally and diplomatically. In effect the D O P agreement means that the leading representatives of the Palestinian Diaspora now accept the partition of the former mandate territory of Palestine – a solution proposed by the UN in 1947 and rejected by the Arab side at the time. The PA enjoys considerable autonomy even within the existing parameters. This authority has not always been exercised wisely since 1994. Indeed Arafat has been variously accused of authoritarianism within the PA and cronyism within the leadership. On the Israeli side the need is still evident for that state's leaders and its public opinion to recognize that eventual Palestinian statehood is highly probable.

**Pluralism** This term is used in two senses in international relations. First, as a perspective on the structure of the system. Here pluralism may be taken as a portmanteau term covering all those who reject the assumptions of state-centrism in preference for some kind of mixed actor model. Second, pluralism is derived from political sociology where it is used to identify political systems where power is shared among a plurality of competing parties and interest groups. Pluralism is thus a theory both of inter-state and intra-state politics.

Pluralism in the first sense argues that the assumptions of the traditional state-centred view of world politics were derived from a period when the level of interconnectedness between states was significantly lower than at present. Pluralists argue that there has been a massive erosion in the impermeability of the state during the twentieth century in a number of directions. This erosion is explained in the pluralist literature by reference to the idea of interdependence, particularly in the issue area of economic relations. Pluralists indeed believe that certain economic goals – often bundled together as 'wealth/welfare issues'

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## Plutonium

– can only be realized by states becoming more collaborative with other state and non-state actors. Thus the state is seen as more integrated into the global system by pluralists than by realists. Because the system is one of mixed actors, the defining characteristic of the actor becomes ►autonomy rather than ►sovereignty. The pluralists argue that actors such as the IMF or the PLO can be said to enjoy a measure of autonomy and should therefore be included in any model of world politics. For pluralism the concept of actor is relative: it cannot be fixed by some legal principle such as sovereignty; rather, it depends upon the context of the issue area. Pluralists also hold that the billiard ball metaphor gives a distorted picture of intrastate politics. Black-boxing or reifying the state misrepresents the domestic political process. Because pluralism is also a theory of how domestic politics works – at least in those systems which are pluralist – then holding to this perspective produces a rather different picture of policy-making as well as ►macropolitics. In particular, pluralists are far more willing to build the bureaucratic and organizational context of the policy system into their modelling and, conversely, to abandon or modify ideas about ►rationality.

The growth and development of ethnic self-consciousness and the emergence of subnational and transnational interests associated with the same have, according to the pluralists, had important implications for the idea of the \*nation-state as the typical actor in macropolitics. Any idea that there is a neat and tidy fit between the state and the nation must be revised in the light of widespread evidence of ►ethnic nationalism as a centrifugal force working in many states against state-centred ►nationalism. Some conception of the ethnic diversity of many states can be demonstrated by an examination of language as a variable. On this criteria only a small minority of states are ethnically homogeneous. If loyalty to and identify with the state, through the instrument of nationalism, is not guaranteed in the present system then, at minimum, the billiard ball model needs revision, if not abandonment.

Pluralists argue that many problems in macropolitics, such as combating pollution or ►proliferation, cannot be resolved by states taking a narrow, self-centred view. If these problem-solving tasks are so approached the result will be self-defeating. Instead states must recognize a common interest and engage in cooperation, ►harmonization and even sectoral integration in order to produce positive-sum solutions. States may engage in institution-building which will further erode their autonomy. ►►Liberalism; neoliberalism

**Plutonium** An artificially created fissile material. Plutonium was discovered in 1941 when it was produced by bombarding uranium 238 with neutrons. Plutonium 239, as it is known, is a fissile material like uranium 235, but unlike the latter its production is easier and cheaper. This facility has undoubtedly contributed to the ►proliferation of nuclear weapons since 1945.

**Polarity** A concept used in ►systems analysis, polarity implies that within a

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Postmodernism

Since the modern era and the advent of rapid population growth, intellectual opinion has tended to take a globalist position and see unrestrained growth as deleterious. This tradition was first enunciated in the writings of Thomas Malthus, the nineteenth-century thinker who was the father of intellectual pessimism about population growth and resources. His basic tenet was that population will tend to outstrip the means of sustaining it. Stabilization might be achieved by positive restraint, but it is more likely that population stability will be restored by the negative checks of famine, pestilence and war. Such is the impact of Malthusian tendency statements that in the twentieth century climate of opinion pessimism still tends to pervade thinking about population trends. Thus the first Brandt report spoke of a 'vicious circle' between high birth rates and poverty in the Third World. Malthus is now, however, presented with a humanized face. Population management is the twentieth-century extension of Malthusian 'positive' checks. There is no gainsaying the point that since 1950 the South has experienced a population explosion. Infant mortality rates in these regions fell by half between 1950 and 1980. Famine and malnutrition are more likely to be caused by political mismanagement and the fall-out from war than by some kind of Malthusian inevitability. Paradoxically population management has been least successful where it is needed most - in the Fourth World. Lack of resources and conservative cultural traditions again emphasize that population dynamics are not easy to control or manage.

➤Resource war

**Postmodernism** (➤Critical Theory)

**Power** Power is one of the essentially contested concepts in the study of international relations. Unfortunately its usage in the past and at the present often betrays ambivalence and confusion. As a term it has affinities with coercion, influence and so on. It has been described by one author as a portmanteau concept and accordingly it is difficult, if not impossible to define with any precision. Rather it is seen as a something covering a range of eventualities from the force/coercion mode to the influence/authority mode. Baldwin (1979) has argued that greater clarity and precision had been achieved in recent years by regarding power as a causal concept. McClelland (1966) saw fresh hope in the possibility of borrowing from the community power literature. Unfortunately, political sociologists are not in any more agreement among themselves than any other discipline about power, as Waste (1986) has shown.

The power tradition in international relations, at least, is now indelibly associated with the realist tradition and the writings of Morgenthau (1948). Realism is covered elsewhere but two points should be noted in passing. First, Morgenthau defines power in the broadest possible terms. This catch-all approach is definitely *de rigueur* today. Second, Morgenthau was not without his critics within the realist tradition and that, accordingly, his qualification to be their spokesperson should not go unchallenged. Much of the realist discussion



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## Postmodernism

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of power has consisted of a debate between Morgenthau and his critics.

Most post-realist discussions of power now begin by making a basic distinction between power meaning a ►capability or possession and power meaning a relationship. Thus Knorr (1973) speaks of putative and actualized power. Some writers have suggested indeed that confusion might be reduced if the term capability was used in the first sense above and that 'power' be reserved for the relational usage.

Capability analysis has a long and distinguished tradition informed in particular by political geography and political economy. Factors such as GNP and GNP per capita, ►population size and land area, level of literacy and size of armed forces, skill and morale of the ►leadership and the diplomatic service come to mind whenever people engage in capability analysis. The idea of ►hierarchy depends upon a differential spread of capabilities. The Sprouts (1971) sought to emphasize that capability analysis should always take place within 'some framework of policies and/or operational contingencies actual or postulated' (p. 176). Dahl (1984), with his stress on ►domain and ►scope, adds the reminder that power relations operate over someone (domain) with regard to a particular ►issue area (scope). Baldwin has argued in the above-cited article that this approach to the capability/power idea is based upon recognition that capabilities have, generally, low ►fungibility and that it is for this reason that attention needs to be paid to domain and scope.

Capability is a necessary condition for the power relationship. Without such possessions it is impossible for an ►actor to obtain compliant behaviour and the aim of the power relationship is to seek and secure compliance. Compliant behaviour may consist of doing something different or it may consist of continuing with a behaviour pattern than an actor really wishes to drop. Moreover, in power relations the expectation is always made that the compliance will have to overcome resistance from the target. In summary then, power relations involve one actor or group of actors in overcoming the resistance of another actor, or group, and securing compliance thereby. Power relationships are confined to situations of social opposition. Their distinguishing characteristic is that sanctions will be used to secure compliance. A sanction can be either positive or negative, that is to say, it may offer rewards or it may threaten punishments. To make either, or both, these contingencies available the actor(s) must possess the capability, which is why it was stated earlier that putative power is a necessary condition for actualized power.

Because power relationships involve the use of sanctions to overcome resistance they can properly be seen as coercive. In this way it is possible, at least analytically, to distinguish, for instance, the power relationship from the influence relationship. Influence is then, in one sense, a non-coercive form of power. Because power relationships involve coercion they can have unpredictable results on the actor(s) being coerced. Rather than securing compliance, sanctions can stiffen resistance and make a target actor determined to 'tough it

## Power politics

out' in the face of threats and/or bribes. Moreover, threats cost more if they fail while rewards cost more if they succeed. A threat that fails to produce compliance has to be carried out in order to maintain ►credibility. A reward that succeeds has to be carried through for the same reason. It can be seen, then, that positive and negative sanctions do no work in the same way or within the same psychological framework. On this latter point ►perceptions play an important role in determining how a target actor will respond. Rewards can be seen as punitive in certain circumstances. A state which has been receiving foreign ►aid can see a sudden suspension or reduction in its aid quota as a punishment if the cessation is linked to demands for compliant behaviour.

Power relations exist over time and perceptions of the past can influence reactions in the present or anticipation for the future. Moreover this mixing of past, present and future will be multidimensional. Actors will generalize about experiences with each other and with third parties in a form of 'learning theory'. The UK reaction to the proposed economic sanctions against ►apartheid was not solely a desire to protect vested interests. Following their perceived and controversial failure over Rhodesian UDI, sanctions were seen by some received opinion as being slow working and misdirected. US anguish during the ►Vietnam ►intervention was in part explicable in terms of their failure to be seen to be securing any of their objectives but also in terms of their perception that failure would adversely affect their 'standing' as a loyal and trustworthy ally. In both these examples it would seem that generalizations about power in one relationship can, as it were, 'crossover' into other relationships. ►Structural Power

### Power politics Realism

**Pre-emption** Pre-emption occurs when an ►actor commits itself to a course of action that is crucially influenced by anticipation of what another actor intends to do. It has been widely applied to the area of ►strategic studies where it is envisaged that an actor might pre-empt an attack upon itself by striking a putative adversary first. In effect, therefore, pre-emption is a special case of a surprise attack. Writers like Richard Betts (1982, 1987) have argued that US policy-makers and defence planners were attracted to the logic of this strategy during the period of greatest ►Cold War tension and that in certain crisis situations – notably over Cuba – it would have been initiated. Betts argues that pre-emptive attack is easier to justify politically than preventive war but that the latter may be more viable militarily.

Like all decision-making situations, pre-emption relies upon good ►intelligence about an enemy's capabilities and a shrewd assessment of its intentions. Conversely ►misperception of either or both can be damaging. Stalin's desire not to provoke a pre-emptive strike from Germany in 1941 led the Soviet Union into a level of military unpreparedness which was most detrimental when the German preventative strike actually came.

**Realism** Sometimes called the 'power-politics' school of thought, political realism in one form or another has dominated both academic thinking on international relations and the conceptions of policy-makers and diplomats, certainly since Machiavelli contemplated the subject.

The ideas associated with it can be traced to the ancient Greeks and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is widely regarded as the first sustained attempt to explain the origins of international conflict in terms of the dynamics of power politics. Machiavelli in *The Prince* (1513) and Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651) also provided crucial components of this tradition, especially in their conceptions of interest, prudence, and expediency as prime motivators in the essentially anarchic context of international relations. As a theory, or a set of propositions about the individual, the state, and the state-system, it reached the height of its appeal, especially in the Anglo-American world, in the years after 1940 when it appeared to explain the 'lessons' of appeasement and the inception of the Cold War era. Thereafter it was challenged on essentially methodological grounds by the behavioural or social science approaches but it reappeared in the 1980s in the guise of neorealism. Among its most prominent early adherents were: E. H. Carr, R. Neibuhr, J. Herz, H. J. Morgenthau, G. Schwarzenberger, M. Wight, N. Spykman and G. F. Kennan. Despite the basic weakness of some of their methodology, this group spawned a generation of distinguished scholars who continued the power-orientated approach of their predecessors. Among these were: R. Aron, H. Bull, H. Kissinger, R. E. Osgood, R. Rosecrance, K. W. Thompson, R. W. Tucker, K. N. Waltz and Arnold Wolfers. The restatement of its central concepts, albeit in a highly deductive, systemic presentation (Waltz, 1979 and Keohane, 1986), testifies to its enduring appeal both on the campus and in the chancellery. Without doubt, political realism is the most successful and perhaps the most compelling of the classical paradigms that shaped the development of the discipline.

The tradition focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in international relations and its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. International politics, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as 'a struggle for power'. 'Power' in this sense is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself, and although definitions are notoriously loose and slippery its general meaning is the ability to influence or change the behaviour of others in a desired direction, or alternatively the ability to resist such influences one's own behaviour. In this sense a state's ability to act and react is a function of the power it possesses. The idea of self-help is central as is the notion of sovereignty, which emphasizes the distinction between the domestic and external realms. The addition of an 's' to the word 'state' creates not just a plural, but involves crossing a conceptual boundary. States answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves to protect their interests and to ensure survival. The

## Realism

►national interest therefore is defined in terms of power, to the virtual exclusion of other factors such as the promotion of ideological values or of moral principles. The nature of the anarchic state-system necessitates the acquisition of military ►capabilities sufficient at least to deter attack, and the best means of self-preservation is a constant awareness and reiteration of the worst-case scenario. Since all states seek to maximize power, the favoured technique for its management is ►balance of power. Stability and order are the result of skilful manipulations of flexible ►alliance systems: they do not stem from the authoritative force of ►international law or ►organization, which in any case is minimal. The approach is system-dominant in the sense that state behaviour is seen as a derivative of anarchy, but some adherents also claim that since the quest for power and self-interest is inherent in human nature, the states-system is a logical consequence as well as a reflection of it. The realists emphasize the persistence of ►conflict and competition in international affairs; cooperation is possible but only when it serves the national interest. The structure of the international system gravitates towards a ►hierarchy based on power capabilities and the notion of ►equality is at a discount, except in the formal sense that all states are equal states.

Criticisms of the realist paradigm have been legion. It has been attacked for lack of methodological consistency, imprecision on the definition of key terms and for all its ethical implications and overall policy costs. Its obsession with ►high politics and its presumption about the impermeability and centrality of the state had led to alternative approaches where non-strategic diplomatic issues and non-state actors are highlighted. Critics have also pointed out that political realism did not accurately describe, let alone explain, some of the major developments in the post-Second World War period, in particular the cooperative and integrative movements in Western Europe and elsewhere, as well as the apparent disutility of military force in increasingly larger ►issue areas of ►international politics. However, it remains an important theoretical perspective and one which for generations of scholars and practitioners best captures the essence of the international political system. The states-system is still anarchic, states are still the central actors and the ►great powers are still the most dominant. Recognition of this as well as a keen appreciation of the methodological shortfalls of traditional realism led some scholars to re-examine the role of power in the system, in particular its role in achieving cooperation under conditions of anarchy. K. N. Waltz's (1979) influential *Theory of International Politics* is the most far-reaching theoretical attempt so far to re-establish, albeit in a more rigorous form, the central tenets of realism. For Waltz, the central feature of a theory of international politics is the distribution of power. It is the structural constraints of the global system itself which to a large extent explain state behaviour and dictate outcomes. This 'structural realism' argues that changes in actor behaviour are explained in terms of the system itself rather than in terms of a variation in attributes that actors may display. This

concentration on the level of the international political system rather than its component units has become part of the 'neo-' or 'structural' realist revival. While concentration on transnational relations and complex interdependence challenges key assumptions of political realism (especially that nation-states are the only important actors) the ideas associated with power and its distribution are still central to any sophisticated understanding of IR. The nature of power may have changed, but not the uses to which it has traditionally been put.

► Neorealism, neoliberalism

**Realpolitik** A nineteenth-century German term referring to the adoption of policies of limited objectives which had a reasonable chance of success. It gained popularity as a result of the disillusionment felt in some quarters with the lack of realism in policies pursued by the liberals during the 1848-9 revolution. It has been most often used to describe Bismarck's policies and indicates a shrewd attention to detail, an inclination to moderation and a willingness to use force if necessary. It is often wrongly used as a synonym for power politics and in twentieth-century literature it carries negative connotations because of its association with non-negotiable demands of the Third Reich.

**Rebus sic stantibus** Refers to a fundamental change of circumstance, normally used in relation to treaty law. If such a change is deemed to have occurred then a party to an agreement may withdraw from or terminate it; if circumstances remain the same (*rebus sic stantibus*) then the treaty is binding (*pacta sunt servanda*). This doctrine has been subject to much criticism by international lawyers since it can operate as an escape clause and may be used to evade all sorts of treaty obligations. Modern practice is to severely limit its scope. The notion of 'fundamental change' is a slippery one and Article 62 of the Vienna Convention has confined it to changes 'not foreseen by the parties' and changes which 'radically transform the extent of obligations'. Thus, for example, the election of a communist government in Britain might be regarded as a 'fundamental change of circumstances' in relation to membership of NATO, whereas the election of a Labour government would not, since the Labour Party was in office when the treaty was signed.

**Reciprocity** Keohane (1986) defines reciprocity as 'exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent upon the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad' (p. 8). Colloquially this is the principle of give-and-take or 'quid pro quo' (something for something). Three points should be noted about the Keohane definition: the importance of equivalence, the idea of contingency and the fact that 'reciprocity' subsumes both good or bad behaviour being reciprocated. Equivalence is inherent in the idea of reciprocity, but is broadly defined as approximate rather than exact. Keohane distinguishes 'specific' reciprocity where an equivalent outcome is expected for both/all parties from 'diffuse'

The main institutional innovation to emerge from the Uruguay Round was the establishment of a world trade organization (WTO). Technically a treaty has been replaced by an IGO with this move. The evident growth of economic regionalism in the system in the 1990s enhances the felt need for a more powerful means to supervise the trade agreements reached under the GATT aegis over many years.

*uti possidetis* A politico-legal principle associated with rights of sovereignty and in particular territorial claims made by successor states to former imperial possessions. Originally a Latin American concept used to define and delimit the boundaries of the old Spanish empire, it was explicitly adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its second summit in Cairo in 1964. Essentially, it reaffirmed African colonial boundaries established at the Berlin Conference of 1885 and all member states pledged to respect the 'intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonisation.' This has subsequently become an important principle of African politics and 'uti possidetis' has been used to counter secessionist arguments throughout the continent. In particular, the acceptance of colonial boundaries by the newly independent states meant that Kwame Nkrumah's proposal for a 'United States of Africa' which would transcend the colonial legacy was defeated. Thereafter, the Pan-African ideal has expressed itself in terms of 'solidarity and cooperation' between states rather than in terms of political integration. Since 1964 Africa's boundaries have remained more or less stable despite disintegrative movements especially in the former Belgian Congo, Nigeria and Sudan. Two notable successful challenges to the principle of 'uti possidetis' were the creation of Eritrea in 1991 and the transfer of the port and harbour of Walvis Bay from South African to Namibian sovereignty in 1994. Despite this apparent boundary stability, the fragility of many African states as well as their cross-cutting ethnic loyalties indicates that this principle may not prove immutable in a post-Cold War period characterized by increasing intra-state conflict. It may well prove to be the case, as Basil Davidson suggests, that the attempt to create a European-style states-system in Africa is the final curse left behind by the imperial powers.

**Utopianism** Refers to a tradition of thought in international relations which argues that perpetual peace, equality and the full satisfaction of wants is both desirable and possible in world politics. The term was popularized by Carr (1939), whose book itself was a devastating critique of this mode of thinking. Carr used the term in two distinct but related senses.

- 1 Utopianism is the first or 'primitive stage in the development of a science of international politics where the 'the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong'. This was the case, he believed, in the period immediately following the First World War when the inclination to analyse facts was weak or non-existent and when visionary projects (e.g. world

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government, collective security) dominated thinking about the subject. This stage was followed by political ►realism which is 'a stage of hard and ruthless analysis' of external reality. Only when international politics has passed through both these stages could it properly be called a science or discipline and even then, as a social science, elements of utopianism would remain.

- 2 Utopianism also refers to a specific school of thought whose proponents, arguing from the first principles, construct schemes for the elimination of ►war and the establishment of eternal peace. In this sense the term is interchangeable with ►idealism, liberalism and rationalism. Central to this school, according to Carr, is the *laissez faire* doctrine of ►harmony of interests, whereby each ►actor in pursuing his own rationally perceived good, also pursues the good of the international community as a whole. Politically, this doctrine of the identity of interests took the form of 'an assumption that every nation has an identical interest in peace, and that any nation which desires to disturb the peace is therefore both irrational and immoral' (p. 51). Principal twentieth-century proponents were Woodrow Wilson, Bertrand Russell, Norman Angell, A. E. ►Zimmern, G. Lowes-Dickinson and Gilbert Murray, but the tradition also embraced philosophers such as the Abbé Saint-Pierre and Kant.

Carr's critique of utopianism in 1939 set the stage for the somewhat sterile realist/idealist debate which dominated Anglo-American academic international politics for at least the next two decades. ►Neorealism